Aspenwood v. C.A.T : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2001
Aspenwood v. C.A.T : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard D. Burbidge, Stephen B. Mitchell; attorneys for appellees.
Brian W. Steffensen, Damian E. Davenport; attorneys for appellants.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Aspenwood v. C.A.T, No. 20010735 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3450
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Aspenwood, L.L.C., et al. APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. Civil No. 20010735-SQCA 
C.A.T., L.L.C., et al. 
Defendants/ Appellees. 
Nature of Proceeding: 
Appeal from the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable William B. Bohling, Presiding 
Argument Priority Classification: 15 
Brian W. Steffensen (3092) 
Damian E. Davenport (8169) 
Steffensen ••• Law ••• Office 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Tel: (801) 485-3707 
Fax: (801) 485-7140 
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants 
Richard D. Burbidge (0492) 
Stephen B. Mitchell (2278) 
Burbidge & Mitchell 
130 East South Temple, Suite 2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents/Appellees 
Petitioner/Appellant requests oral argument and a Published Opinion speals 
Pauiette Stagg 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Aspenwood, L.L.C., et al. APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. Civil No. 20010735-SC 
C.A.T., L.L.C., et al. 
Defendants/ Appellees. 
Nature of Proceeding: 
Appeal from the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable William B. Bohling, Presiding 
Argument Priority Classification: 15 
Brian W. Steffensen (3092) 
Damian E. Davenport (8169) 
Steffensen ••• Law • Office 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Tel: (801) 485-3707 
Fax: (801) 485-7140 
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants 
Richard D. Burbidge (0492) 
Stephen B. Mitchell (2278) 
Burbidge & Mitchell 
130 East South Temple, Suite 2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents/Appellees 
Petitioner/Appellant requests oral argument and a Published Opinion 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT IN REPLY TO DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES' BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiffs Filed Two Notices of Appeal in this Case - the First Appealing 
Issues That Occurred up Through the Entry of Final Judgment Herein, 
and the Second Appealing Certain Post-judgment Rulings. Both Notices 
of Appeal Were Timely 
B. Plaintiffs Have Fully Complied with Rule 24(a)(7), Which Requires 
Citations to the Record for the "Statement of Facts," Not the Portion of 
the Statement of the Case Which "Briefly [Indicates] the Nature of the Case. 
C. Plaintiffs Brief Does in Fact Deal with Each and Every Issue Raised in 
Their Issues on Appeal 
D. Plaintiffs' Effort to Marshal the Evidence Was Exhaustive, Comprehensive 
and Fully Compliant with the Rules, and Proves That Judge Bohling Ignored 
Undisputed Facts When He Ruled Erroneously for Defendants and 
Against the Plaintiffs in the Specific Particulars Identified in Plaintiffs9 Brief.. 
E. Judge Bohling9s Several Discovery Rulings Had the Cumulative Effect 
of Depriving Plaintiffs of Substantive and Procedural Due Process by 
Denying Them a Full and Fair Opportunity to Engage in Discovery and Prepare 
Their Case for Trial 
F. Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) Motion Was Improperly Denied; Plaintiffs Were 
Denied a Full and Fair Opportunity to Complete Discovery on the Issues 
Raised in the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
G. Plaintiffs' Memoranda Opposing the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
on the Failure to Fund Claims and the Alter Ego Claims Were Substantial, 
Detailed and Comprehensive and Created More than Sufficient Disputes as 
to Material Facts to Require the Denial Thereof. 10 
-ii-
H. Defendants' Claim That "Fraud" Gave CAT the Right to Refuse to Fund 
the Hidden Ridge Project Is Misdirected; Taggart Deceitfully Accused 
Hoggan and Oman of "Fraud" in Order to Buy Time for Aspenwood to 
Get the Funds to Compete the Purchase and Development of the Project; 
CAT and Baucorp All Agreed among Themselves to Proceed with the 
Hidden Ridge Project; CAT Can Not Get out of Complying with its Express 
Agreement and Promise to Baucorp That it Would Fund the Hidden Ridge 
Project on this Flimsy Ground 11 
I. It Was an Outrageous Abuse of Discretion to Deny Plaintiffs the Right to 
the Trial by Jury Which They Had Timely Demanded and Paid for Absent 
Clear and Unequivocal Evidence in the Record That Plaintiffs Had Waived 
a Jury; There Is No Document on File Signed by Plaintiffs, Nor Any Transcript, 
Containing an Express Waiver of Trial by Jury; All of Judge Bohling's Rulings 
must Be Reversed and this Matter Remanded for Trial by Jury 12 
J. Plaintiffs' Case Against CAT and Taggart Was Not Just a "Fraud Case," 
as Defendants Suggest, but Rather Included Claims for Breach of Warranty 
and Negligent Misrepresentation; the Undisputed Facts as Marshaled by 
Plaintiffs Clearly Shows That Taggart/CAT Made Express Warranties to JMS 
Which Turned out Not to Be True and upon Which JMS Relied 13 
Elements of Breach of Warranty 13 
Elements of Negligent Misrepresentation 14 
K. The Issuance of Charging Orders Without Notice and a Hearing Was a 
Denial of Substantive and Procedural Due Process; Plaintiffs Appealed 
the Ruling Promptly and Have Not Waived It 17 
L. Hal Rosen Fully and Fairly Answered Questions Within the Scope of Inquiry 
Approved by Judge Bohling, but Judge Bohling Sanctioned Him Anyway 19 
M. The Placing of Aspenwood in a Defacto Receivership Was Procedurally and 
Substantively Improper; the Issue Is Certainly Not Moot; Litigation Has 
Arisen to Challenge the Improper Siphoning off of Monies from Aspenwood 
by CAT and its "Partner" - Dan Mehr 23 
STATEMENT OF RELIEF REQUESTED 25 
in 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Christensen v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co.. 666 P. 2d 302 (Utah 1983) 
154 
Dugan v. Jones. 615 P. 2d 1239 (Utah 1980) 14 
Ellis v. Hale. 373 P. 2d 382 14 
Herring v. Keasler. 563 SE. 2d 614 (NC App. 2002) 24 
Jardine v. Brunswick Corp.. 18 Utah 2d 378, 381,423 P. 2d 659, 662 (1967) 15 
Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P. 2d 1207 (Utah 1983) 9,19 
STATUTES 
UCA 48-2M31 17, 18 
RULES 
URAP 24(a)(7) 3 
URCP 45 20 
URCP 56(f) & (c) 9,10 
URCP 69 23, 24 
-iv-
Summary of Argument in Reply to Defendants/Appellees' Brief 
The Defendants' opposition to Plaintiffs' Appeal is misplaced for the following reasons: 
1. Plaintiffs filed two notices of appeal in this case - the first appealing issues that occurred 
up through the entry of final judgment herein, and the second appealing certain post-
judgment rulings. Both notices of appeal were timely, and the appeals consolidated. 
2. Plaintiffs have fully complied with Rule 24(a)(7), which requires citations to the record for 
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[indicates] the nature of the case. 
3. Plaintiffs brief does in fact deal with each and every issue raised in their issues on appeal. 
4. Plaintiffs' effort to marshal the evidence (found in Addendum 6) was exhaustive, 
comprehensive and fully compliant with the rules, and proves that Judge Bohling ignored 
undisputed facts when he ruled erroneously for defendants and against the plaintiffs in the 
specific particulars identified in plaintiffs' brief. 
5. Judge Bohling's several discovery rulings had the cumulative effect of depriving plaintiffs 
of substantive and procedural due process by denying them a full and fair opportunity to 
engage in discovery and prepare their case for trial. 
6. Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) Motion was improperly denied; plaintiffs were denied a full and fair 
opportunity to complete discovery on the issues raised in the motion for partial summary 
judgment. 
7. Plaintiffs' memoranda opposing the motion for partial summary judgment on the failure to 
fund claims and the alter ego claims were detailed and comprehensive and created more 
than sufficient disputes as to material facts to require the denial thereof. 
8. Defendants' claim that "fraud" gave CAT the right to refuse to fund the Hidden Ridge 
project is misdirected. It is true that Taggart accused Hoggan and Oman of "fraud," but 
only so as to buy time for Aspenwood to get the funds to compete the purchase and 
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development of the project. This is an attempt to direct the Court's attention away from 
the controlling fact that the principals of CAT and Baucorp had all agreed among 
themselves to proceed with the Hidden Ridge project despite these false claims of fraud 
against Hoggan and Oman. CAT can not get out of complying with its express agreement 
and promise to Baucorp that it would fund the Hidden Ridge project on this flimsy ground. 
9. It was an outrageous abuse of discretion to deny plaintiffs the right to the trial by jury 
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nor any transcript of statements made by plaintiffs' counsel, containing an express waiver 
of trial by jury. All of Judge Bohling's rulings must be reversed and this matter remanded 
for trial by jury 
10. Plaintiffs' case against CAT and Taggart was not just a "fraud case," as defendants suggest, 
but rather included claims for BREACH OF WARRANTY and NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION; the undisputed facts as marshaled by plaintiffs in Addendum 6 
clearly show that Taggart/CAT made express warranties to JMS which turned out not to be 
true and upon which JMS relied. 
11. The granting of an ex parte motion for issuance of charging orders without notice and a 
hearing was a denial of JMS' substantive and procedural due process. Plaintiffs appealed 
the ruling which denied this due process promptly and have not waived it. 
12. The undisputed facts show that Hal Rosen fully and fairly answered questions within the 
scope of inquiry approved by Judge Bohling, but Judge Bohling sanctioned him anyway 
13. The placing of Aspenwood in a defacto receivership was procedurally and substantively 
improper; the issue is certainly not moot; litigation has arisen to challenge the improper 
siphoning off of monies from Aspenwood by CAT and its "partner" - Dan Mehr. In fact, 




A. Plaintiffs' Filed Two Notices of Appeal in this Case - the First Appealing Issues that 
Occurred Up Through the Entry of Final Judgment Herein, and the Second 
Appealing Certain Post-Judgment Rulings. Both Notices of Appeal Were Timely. 
The Defendants make the absurd claim that Plaintiffs' appeal was not timely filed. Final 
judgment was entered on June 28, 2001. R. 4665-4668. Plaintiffs (including JMS) filed their first 
Notice of Appeal on July 25, 2001. That notice states that the 
"Plaintiffs ... by and through their undersigned counsel... appeal... all rulings and orders 
entered in this case by Third District Court trial Judge William B. Bohling that were 
decided against their interests herein. The appeal is taken from the entirety of all orders 
and rulings entered by the Court in this action, including, but not limited to, Summary 
Judgment, entered on or about June 29, 2001; denial of jury trial; all discovery-related 
motions and order; the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered by the 
Court on June 29, 2001. 
R. 4883-4885 A second Notice of Appeal was filed on August 24, 2001 with respect to certain 
post-judgment rulings. R. 5067 Both Notices were filed timely with respect to the matters 
appealed therein. The two appeals were consolidated at the appellate level. The Defendants 
apparently have misread the first Notice of Appeal. 
B. Plaintiffs Have Fully Complied with Rule 24(a)(7), Which Requires Citations to the 
Record for the "Statement of Facts," Not the Portion of the Statement of the Case 
Which "Briefly [Indicates] the Nature of the Case" 
Defendants/Appellees begin their brief with the charge that Plaintiffs violated Rule 24 by 
not citing to the record in their "Statement of the Case." Rule 24(a)(7) "Statement of the Case" 
requires the Appellant to set forth a "statement" which: 
"shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its 
disposition in the court below. A statement of facts relevant to the issues presented for 
review shall follow. All statements of fact... shall be supported by citations to the record 
The "STATEMENT OF FACTS" in Plaintiffs' Appellants' Brief is fully supported by 
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citations to the record. 
C. Plaintiffs' Brief Does In Fact Deal With Each and Every Issue Raised in Their Issues 
on Appeal. 
Defendants claim that "the JMS Parties ... fail[ed] to brief most of the purported issues 
[raised] for review," without setting forth with specificity which issues they believe were not dealt 
with. Plaintiffs did in fact deal with all of the issues raised. Plaintiffs do rely heavily on their 
various memoranda filed with the Trial Court to make their arguments, which are all incorporated 
by reference in and/or attached as Addenda to the Appellants' Brief. But with a one hundred page 
limit, and the many issues involved in this appeal, Plaintiffs were naturally forced to rely more 
heavily than usual on the analysis in their memoranda filed with the Trial Court. There are 
specific references to the appropriate underlying memoranda in connection with each and every 
issue raised. And the underlying memoranda contain the arguments and case law which support 
Plaintiffs/Appellants' positions herein. 
D. Plaintiffs' Effort to Marshall the Evidence Was Comprehensive and Fully Compliant 
with the Rules, and Clearly Demonstrates That Judge Bohling Ignored Undisputed 
Facts When he Ruled Erroneously For Defendants and Against the Plaintiffs in the 
Specific Particulars Identified in Plaintiffs' Brief 
Defendants cavalierly claim that Plaintiffs did not properly marshal the evidence in their 
Appellants' Brief without providing any examples of any relevant evidence which Plaintiffs 
supposedly left out of their analysis. In fact, on page 19 of their Brief, Defendants claim that 
"JMS has not even attempted to marshal the evidence that supports the findings or to otherwise 
demonstrate that the findings are clearly erroneous." Defendants either have not read Addendum 
6 in ADDENDA Vol. 2, entitled "Marshaled Evidence, Including JMS' Supplemental Post-Trial 
Memoranda," attached to the Appellants' Brief and incorporated therein, or they hope that this 
Court will not notice it and/or read it. Addendum 6 with excruciating detail marshals all of the 
evidence relating to each one of the critical factual issues challenged by Plaintiffs in their 
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Appellants' Brief. Addendum 6 consists of the following parts: (a) Marshaled Evidence - which 
contains 26 pages of marshaled evidence on certain issues; (b) Plaintiffs Supplemental Post-Trial 
Memorandum; (c) Plaintiffs Reply Supplemental Post-Trial Memorandum and (d) Plaintiffs 
Reply with Citations. Then, Addendum 7 contains JMS' Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, wherein JMS pointed out in detail why each and every conclusion of law 
complained of was erroneous. In connection with each factual issue dealt with, the Addendum 6 
materials cite the defendants' argument and evidence (if there is any), and demonstrate how the 
facts at trial overwhelming support the Plaintiffs' position. Bohling's Findings of Fact are 
comprehensively analyzed and criticized in Addendum 6 and Addendum 7. Consequently, for 
the purposes of this Appeal one cannot take Bohling's findings as uncontroverted, but must 
measure them against the marshaled evidence in Addendum 6 and the detailed criticism thereof in 
Addendum 7. 
CAT admitted in its Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Overlength Reply 
Brief that Plaintiffs were "finally" marshaling the evidence. Since the material complained of by 
CAT in the first Reply Brief is found in its entirety, verbatim, in Addendum 6(d), Plaintiffs believe 
that CAT has essentially admitted that Addendum 6 contains properly marshaled evidence. 
Plaintiffs' essentially marshaled the evidence in their post-trial memoranda (subparts b-d of 
Addendum 6) by including therein exhaustive citations to and/or quotes from the record. These 
memoranda would likely have been sufficient in and of themselves for the purposes of this Appeal. 
They are not just "snippets" from the record. They contain the entire testimony adduced relating to 
the issues of Taggart's and CAT's misrepresentations to JMS. However, out of an abundance of 
caution, Plaintiffs prepared and submitted an additional twenty-six pages of "Marshaled 
Evidence" material which is set forth in subpart a at the beginning of Addendum 6, and which 
precedes the post-trial memoranda found in subparts b - d of Addendum 6. 
Not only does this Addendum 6 (including the post-trial memoranda) marshal all of the 
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relevant evidence, but it contains relevant argument to clearly explain why the evidence so 
marshaled demonstrates that there is absolutely no dispute as to what Taggart and CAT knew, 
when they knew it, and what they told JMS in the meeting prior to JMS purchasing CAT's interest 
in Aspenwood. In light of this fully marshaled and undisputed evidence, it is incontrovertible 
that Judge Bohling's factual findings are contrary to the undisputed facts which were adduced at 
trial and must be set aside as clearly erroneous. Judgment should be directed for Plaintiffs on at 
least the Breach of Warranty claims. It was clearly erroneous for Judge Bohling to have refused to 
find that Taggart/CAT did not make express warranties as to the status of the Hidden Ridge 
Project. It was clearly erroneous for Judge Bohling to have refused to rule that JMS reasonably 
relied thereon and was damaged thereby. 
E. Judge Bohling9s Several Discovery Rulings Had the Cumulative Effect of Depriving 
Plaintiffs of Substantive and Procedural Due Process by Denying Them a Full and 
Fair Opportunity to Engage in Discovery and Prepare Their Case For Trial 
Plaintiffs filed suit and served the defendants in late Fall of 1999 with a complaint raising 
multiple claims and seeking recovery in the many millions of dollars with respect to not less than 
five major real estate development projects. This was and is a complex case requiring extensive 
discovery and analysis. Hoping to get discovery off to a quick start, Plaintiffs served written 
discovery requests and noticed up depositions, including that of Dan Mehr, for January and 
February of 2000. Defendants refused to honor the noticed depositions and filed motions for 
protective order on the petty ground that they wanted to take Dan Mehr's deposition before the 
time that plaintiffs had noticed it - and did not want JMS to take Mehr's deposition first. 
Defendants claim that Mehr was a part of the "JMS Group." Mehr was never an owner or partner 
in any JMS Entity. His company, Baucorp was both an initial member in Aspenwood and a 
contractor on Hidden Ridge for Aspenwood. He was a percipient witness whose testimony JMS 
and Aspenwood wanted to get down and preserve. There was absolutely nothing wrong with 
noticing up the deposition of a favorable non-party percipient witness. 
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As a result of CAT's motions for protective order, discovery was completely shut down 
until late April of 2000, when Judge Bohling ruled on the motions relating to these depositions. 
When he did rule, Judge Bohling ignored the rule that there is no priority in discovery and entered 
an order setting up a strict sequence of depositions and precluding any other depositions until 
the initially noticed depositions were completed. He also established an October 2000 discovery 
cutoff date - only six months away. 
While on their face these rulings may not seem overly restrictive, in reality they ended up 
being severely and unfairly limiting - especially when coupled with Judge Bohling's subsequent 
refusals to adequately extend discovery in the case when reasonably requested by Plaintiffs. 
For example, the initial discovery cutoff in the case was set for October 13, 2000. This 
left only May, June, July, August and September to complete a very substantial amount of 
discovery in this very complex case. Defendants falsely and outrageously claim that Plaintiffs' 
"refused to take any depositions until August," (Appellee's Brief, p. 30), and "refused to finally 
produce Mrs. Watson ... until the fifth time it was noticed ..." and were otherwise "given more than 
sufficient time to conduct whatever discovery they wanted to take, but continually delayed in 
doing so." Ibid. The only reason for delay from the end of May 2000 when Judge Bohling 
signed the discovery order and August of 2000 was ordinary summer scheduling problems. But, 
when Plaintiffs finally started the depositions of the Defendants' principals (Taggart and Coats) in 
August, it was discovered that the Defendants had failed to produce all of their relevant 
documents - which they did not finally produce until after their Summary Judgment motion was 
filed in late October 2000. Consequently the depositions of Defendants could not be 
completed. 
Then there was in fact about a month's delay in getting dates set for Defendants to take the 
depositions of Rosen, the Watsons and Mehr. Since Defendants had a penchant for noticing up 
depositions without dates being confirmed, it is true that it was not until their Fifth Notice of Mrs. 
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Watson's deposition that they got the date right. 
But - the fact of the matter is that this used up almost all of the discovery time. Plaintiffs 
not only were unable to complete the depositions of Taggart and Coats within the initial discovery 
time (due to the Defendants' failure to timely produce documents), but were absolutely 
precluded - given Judge Bohling's April 2000 order, from taking depositions of any third-
parties relating to any of the five major real estate projects - including, for example, the 
depositions of Americraft and Russell/Packard, major purchasers of lots in Hidden Ridge. 
Plaintiffs not only did not have sufficient "time" to take the depositions desired, but did not have 
permission to even notice them up given Judge Bohling's restrictive order. Judge Bohling 
initially granted an extension to December 2000, and then another short one into January of 2001 -
but only to allow certain very limited third-party depositions. Plaintiffs were never given free 
reign to take any and all third-party depositions that they wanted and needed. 
This in fact unfairly prejudiced the Plaintiffs. For example, at trial Defendants criticized 
Plaintiffs for not producing witnesses from Americraft and/or Russell/Packard to support 
Plaintiffs' claims. This was highly unfair given the fact that Plaintiffs had been precluded from 
taking these depositions by Judge Bohling's series of rulings which at all times kept Plaintiffs in 
hand-cuffs with respect to what discovery they could do. 
This was and is a very complex case. Discovery in such cases often very reasonably takes 
several years. Incredibly, Judge Bohling refused to allow Plaintiffs more than twelve months for 
discovery - AFTER the two short extensions referred to (from January 2000 through January of 
2001). Plaintiffs were not able to do any discovery from January to the end of April of 2000 due 
to Defendants' motions for protective order and refusal to appear. From May of 2000 through the 
final cutoff in January of 2001, Plaintiffs were shackled by the April 2000 Order which precluded 
any depositions at all until the specific depositions in that Order were completed. Plaintiffs only 
had nine months total to do discovery in this very complicated case. At no time during those nine 
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months were they free to conduct any and all discovery that they wanted. Plaintiffs were at all 
times restricted and limited in their ability to conduct meaningful discovery - and for absolutely no 
good reason. That was patently unfair, improper and highly prejudicial. Plaintiffs complained in 
their oppositions to motions for protective orders filed by Defendants when Plaintiffs tried to 
complete the depositions of Taggart, Coats and others; and again in the Spring of 2001 in a motion 
to continue the trial and open discovery, that these severe restrictions had worked an improper 
denial of their substantive and due process rights to a fair trial on the merits. But Judge Bohling 
refused to grant Plaintiffs a full and fair opportunity to do discovery in this case through his rulings 
on the motions to compel/for protective order, and to continue discovery and for a new trial date 
(See Motions to continue discovery and for a new trial date, R. 670-672; 859, 5373, 5374; and 
memoranda relating to efforts to compel Taggart and Coats to complete their depositions, R. 
All of Plaintiffs' objections to the overly and unfairly restrictive discovery constraints and motions 
relating thereto were denied. Judge Bohling forced Plaintiffs to proceed to trial - without the jury 
which had been timely requested and paid for - without having had a full and fair opportunity to 
conduct discovery and prepare their case for trial. 
As the Utah Supreme court has stated, '"Due process' is not a technical concept that can be 
reduced to a formula with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances. Rather, 'the 
demands of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of procedure and demand a procedure 
appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved.'" Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P. 2d 1207 
Plaintiffs were in fact deprived of their substantive and due process rights to full and fair 
discovery, and therefore their right to a fair trial. 
F. Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) Motion Was Improperly Denied; Plaintiffs Were Denied a Full 
and Fair Opportunity to Complete Discovery on the Issues Raised in the Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment 
For the reasons set forth above, in the Rule 56(f) Affidavit of David Condie ( R. 846-852), 
and Plaintiffs' Amended Memorandum in Support of Rule 56(f) Motion and For Continuance (R. 
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859-899 and Addendum 4), it was absolutely prejudicial and improper for Judge Bohling to 
refuse to allow Plaintiffs a full and fair opportunity to complete the discovery relevant to the issues 
raised in the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Relating to Plaintiffs' Alter Ego and Failure 
to Fund claims). Defendants filed their motion on October 20, 2000. The Rule 56(f) Motion 
was filed on November 28, 2000. By that time, JMS and Aspenwood had been afforded only six 
months total (May, June, July, August, September and October of 2000) to try and complete 
discovery in the case. And at no time during this short time frame did Plaintiffs have all of 
Defendants' documents nor a full and unfettered opportunity to take all of the third-party 
depositions that Plaintiffs felt like they needed to develop and support their case. During this 
entire time they could not take any third-party depositions by order of Judge Bohling. When Judge 
Bohling did begrudging allow two short extensions of time, it was only as to a hand-full of the 
possible depositions that Plaintiffs could have taken, and wanted to take. The claim by 
Defendants that JMS had somehow been "dilatory" is feckless on its face. 
G. Plaintiffs' Memoranda Opposing the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the 
Failure to Fund Claims and the Alter Ego Claims Were Substantial, Detailed, 
Comprehensive and Created More Than Sufficient Disputes as to Material Facts to 
Require the Denial Thereof 
Just like in their original Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, Defendants include in their Brief only carefully culled snippets of testimony, often out 
of context. Based on this limited factual record, they are attempting to convince this Court to 
weigh the evidence and rule as a factual matter that Plaintiffs' alter ego and failure to fund claims 
were properly dismissed. Plaintiffs believe that Judge Bohling succumbed to the temptation to 
prematurely weigh the evidence, and that he ignored all of the contrary evidence cited by 
Plaintiffs which placed all of the Defendants' statements of fact in dispute. 
Attached as Addendum 4 to Plaintiffs' Appellants' Brief are Plaintiffs' various 
memoranda opposing the Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and objections 
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challenging the proposed order thereon. They are extensive. They are exhaustive. They are 
comprehensive. 
In response to that portion of Defendants' brief which deals with the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Plaintiffs refer this Court to Addendum 4 - especially Plaintiffs' Amended 
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with its 
extensive citations to deposition testimony and Mehr's affidavits (Addendum 3(h)) and 
Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Objections to 
Defendantsy Proposed Order Granting Summary Judgment - and the chart attached thereto 
showing how Plaintiffs had disputed Defendants' facts (Addendum 3(j)). These documents 
alone set forth over FIFTY PAGES of detailed citations to the factual record disputing 
Defendants' factual premises for their motion. The issue on appeal relating to the propriety of 
Judge Bohling's granting of the partial summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' alter ego and 
failure to fund claims is whether those memoranda created disputed issues of material fact which 
precluded the granting of summary judgment. That can only be determined by taking the time 
to fairly review and analyze those memoranda. Plaintiffs could only briefly paraphrase those 
memoranda in their Appellants' Brief. Plaintiffs will not do so again here. Those memoranda 
speak for themselves and based thereon the motion for partial summary judgment absolutely 
should not have been granted. 
Plaintiffs placed numerous issues of material facts in dispute as to both the alter ego claims 
and the failure to fund claims - more than sufficient to require denial of the motion. 
H. Defendants' Claim That "Fraud" Gave CAT the Right to Refuse to Fund the Hidden 
Ridge Project is Misdirected; Taggart Deceitfully Accused Hoggan and Oman of 
"Fraud" in Order to Buy Time for Aspenwood to get the Funds to Compete the 
Purchase and Development of the Project; Cat and Baucorp all Agreed Among 
Themselves to Proceed With the Hidden Project; CAT Can Not Get out of Complying 
With Its Express Agreement and Promise to Baucorp that it Would fund the Hidden 
Ridge Project on this Flimsy Ground 
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As indicated in Plaintiffs' Marshaled Evidence in Addendum 6, Taggart, Coats and Mehr 
all believed that the Hidden Ridge was going to be highly profitable. Further, the marshaled 
evidence shows that Taggart and Coats could not have reasonably believed that Hoggan and Oman 
had "defrauded" them. Addendum 6, pp. 4-9 Rather, they falsely accused Hoggan and Oman of 
fraud to buy additional time to raise the money necessary to be able to complete the purchase and 
development of the Hidden Ridge property. In any event the purportedly wrongful actions of 
Hoggan and Oman provide no justification for CAT to fail to comply with its obligations to fund 
Hidden Ridge. Their agreement to fund was made with full knowledge of all of the supposed 
"fraud" of Hoggan and Oman. As among themselves, Taggart and Coats had agreed with 
Baucorp to proceed with Hidden Ridge in the Fall of 1998 despite the supposed misrepresentations 
of Hoggan and Oman. 
I. It Was An Outrageous Abuse of Discretion to Deny Plaintiffs the Right to the Trial by 
Jury Which They had Timely Demanded and Paid for ABSENT CLEAR AND 
UNEQUIVOCAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD that Plaintiffs Had Waived a Jury; 
There is No Document on File Signed by Plaintiffs, nor Any Transcript, Containing 
an Express Waiver of Trial by Jury; All of Judge Bohling's Rulings Must be 
Reversed and this Matter Remanded for Trial by Jury 
Plaintiffs/Appellants timely requested a jury, and paid the jury fee. There is nothing in 
the record to indicate that plaintiffs/appellants waived the right to jury - except Judge Bohling's 
claim that he "remembered" that they did. Judge Bohling's testimony in this regard is not only 
unreliable, but is wholly inadmissible. It is improper for a Judge to base a ruling on his own 
testimony as to what happened. Defendants' attorney's claim that he also "remembered" a waiver, 
is too self-serving to properly be the grounds for denial of jury trial. Trial by jury is too important 
a right to be lost without clear and unequivocal evidence in the record that the Plaintiffs in fact 
knowingly and expressly waived it. No such clear and unequivocal evidence of waiver of jury trial 
is found in the record. To the contrary, the record on its face demonstrates that jury trial was in 
fact timely requested and paid for. It was an abuse of discretion for Judge Bohling to have denied 
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the plaintiffs/appellants their right to trial by jury. Judge Bohling's rulings at trial should be 
vacated in their entirety and this matter remanded for trial de novo by a jury (after a full and fair 
discovery period). 
J. Plaintiffs' Case Against CAT and Taggart Was Not Just A "Fraud Case," As 
Defendants Suggest, But Rather Included Claims for BREACH OF WARRANTY 
and NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION; the undisputed facts as marshaled by 
Plaintiffs clearly shows that Taggart/CAT made express warranties to JMS which 
turned out not to be true and upon which JMS relied 
JMS alleged in its complaint that Paul Taggart, John Coats and CAT made certain 
representations and warranties, with the intent that JMS rely upon them in deciding to enter into 
the December 17, 1998 agreement whereby JMS-Hidden purchased CAT's limited liability 
company membership interest in Aspenwood, LLC. Plaintiff JMS further alleged that JMS in fact 
reasonably relied upon these representations and warranties, that they proved to be untrue and that 
JMS has been damaged thereby. JMS also alleged that as a result of said representations and 
warranties being false, it is entitled to recover its damages proximately caused thereby. 
Contrary to CAT's claim that this was only a fraud case, JMS also argued that it could 
recover on its breach of warranty claim without having to show any scienter at all, and without 
having to satisfy the somewhat higher "clear and convincing" standard of proof required to prove 
fraud. 
Elements of Breach of Warranty. 
MUJI 7.37 defines "warranty" as follows: 
"A warranty is an assurance by one party to a contract of the existence of fact upon which 
the other party to the contract may rely. It is intended to relieve the party to whom the 
warranty is made of any duty to ascertain the existence of the fact. A warranty may be 
made expressly in so many words. This is an express warranty. A warranty may also be 
implied from the conduct of the parties or it may be implied by operation of law. This is an 
implied warranty." 
A plaintiff who has been injured as the foreseeable consequence of a breach of warranty on 
the part of a defendant is entitled to recover compensation for such injury from the defendant. In 
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order to prevail, the plaintiff has the burden of proving: (i) that the defendant made a warranty, (ii) 
that the warranty was made under circumstances that the defendant should have reasonably 
expected the plaintiff to rely upon it; (iii) that the warranty turned out not to be true and/or 
accurate; and (iv) the plaintiff was injured as a foreseeable consequence of the warranty not being 
true and/or accurate. See MUJI 7.36. 
Elements of Negligent Misrepresentation. 
Taggart and CAT should also be liable for Negligent Misrepresentation, which is a tort 
which grew out of common-law fraud. It was defined by the Utah Supreme Court in Jardine v. 
Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 381, 423 P. 2d 659, 662 (1967) as follows: 
"Where (1) one having a pecuniary interest in a transaction, (2) is in a superior position to 
know material facts, and (3) carelessly or negligently makes a false representation concerning 
them, (4) expecting the other party to rely and act thereon, and (5) the other party reasonably does 
so and (6) suffers loss in that transaction, the representor can be held responsible if the other 
elements of fraud are also present." 
"Negligent misrepresentation differs from intentional misrepresentation in that in the 
former [negligent misrepresentation] the representor makes an affirmative assertion which is false 
without having used reasonable diligence or competence in ascertaining the verity of the 
assertion." Ellis v. Hale. 373 P. 2d 382. See also Dugan v. Jones, 615 P. 2d 1239 (Utah 1980); 
Christensen v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P. 2d 302 (Utah 1983). 
(See Addendum 6, subpart "Plaintiffs' Supplemental Post-Trial Memorandum" for discussion of 
Intentional and Reckless Fraud and a complete marshalling of the evidence in these regards) 
The Undisputed Facts Adduced At Trial are set forth in comprehensive and excruciating 
detail in Addendum 6. But with respect to Warranty and Negligent Misrepresentation, you start 
with Taggart's testimony as follows (taken from Addendum 6 (a)): 
"26. Taggart admitted that he met with the JMS Group, and that they asked him detailed 
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information about Hidden Ridge, and that he provided them with detailed information ... 
11 Q. (BY MR. STEFFENSEN) What did you do to make 
12 sure that the information that Dan Mehr communicated to 
13 these people was accurate and complete about this 
14 project? 
15 A. Well, the first time I met, the only time I 
16 met Pam Watson and Brent Watson and the JMS people other 
17 than yourself and your brother was in a meeting that Dan 
18 Mehr was present in. Dan Mehr was sitting right next to 
19 me during that entire meeting. 
25 Q. Okay. Now, you admit, don't you, that in 
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1 that meeting you were asked to tell them about all the 
2 land mines and all the skeletons that might be in that 
3 project? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. You were asked that, weren't you? 
6 A. I was. 
7 Q. Okay. And you were asked about the status 
8 of sales, weren't you? 
9 A. Yes, I was. 
10 Q. And you were asked about what was going on 
11 with Kent and Lonnie Oman, right? 
12 A. Yes, I was. 
13 Q. And Pam asked you questions about Dan Mehr's 
14 performance, didn't she? 
15 A. No, she didn't. 
16 Q. Okay, would you turn in your deposition 
17 transcript to page 332. 
18 A. She may have asked questions, but she called 
19 me later to ask me more questions privately. 
20 Q. Turn to page 332. Okay, beginning at line 
21 6 — are you on 332 with me? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Okay. Beginning with line 6, read along, 
24 please. Question, "What do you recall was said by 
25 anyone during that meeting?" Answer, "Urn, you said that 
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1 you wanted me to come and meet with you to get my 
2 perspective on the project of where it stood. Any 
3 potential land mines that were still out there that were 
4 undiscovered, learn about sales, the status of sales. 
15 
5 Um, what was going on with Kent Hoggan and Lonnie. Um, 
6 Pam asked me questions about Dan Mehr's performance and 
7 why we were getting out." Have I read that correctly so 
8 far? 
9 A. Yes, I have. 
10 Q. Question, "Do you recall anything else?" 
11 "Um, that's it." Question, "All right. What do you 
12 recall saying was your perspective about the project?" 
13 Answer, "I believed at that time that we had discovered 
14 the land mines. We had asphalt. It was like, if we 
15 haven't discovered all the land mines by now, I don't 
16 know what other ones there would be there. And that we 
17 felt like we had a very good feel, or Dan felt like he 
18 had a very good feel as to what it would take to finish 
19 the project." 
20 Question, "Was there anything discussed 
21 about what was still necessary to finish the project?" 
22 "Um, I don't recall. You mean as far as dollars, or — 
23 Question, "What work was left to be done." Answer, 
24 "Yes." Question, "And/or dollars to be spent." Answer, 
25 "Yes." Question, "There was a discussion?" Answer, 
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1 "There was." 
2 Question, "What do you recall about that?" 
3 Answer, "I recall that we needed to finish sidewalks and 
4 some curb and electric or utilities that weren't 
5 finished, and the off-site road to the west of the 
6 property still needed to be completed and the fence." 
7 Have I read it there so far correctly? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q». And you don't deny, do you, that you gave 
10 and discussed actual dollar amounts with JMS-Hidden 
11 representatives at that meeting, do you? 
12 A. Say that again. 
13 Q. You don't deny that you discussed actual 
14 dollar amounts that was left to spend for construction 
15 on I his project at that meeting? 
16 A. I don't deny that. 
13 Q. And you told the JMS people that you and Dan 
14 had your arms around the costs of this project, right? 
15 A. Yes, I did. 
16 Q. Okay. That you knew them, right? 
17 A. Yes. 
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From the foregoing, Taggart admits that he provided the JMS Group with detailed information -
and represented that he and Mehr "had their arms around" the project, that they knew about 
all of the problems and costs, and they promised the JMS Group that there would be no 
more surprises 
The promise that there would be "no more surprises," and that JMS could rely upon the 
information provided about the status of sales, the scope of the work to be done, the amount of 
money that would have to be spent to perform the work supposedly left to do, etc., was an 
EXPRESS WARRANTY for the making of which Taggart and CAT must be found liable" 
(quoted from Addendum 6(a), pp. 21-25) 
When none of the representations turned out to be true, JMS was entitled to recovery from 
CAT and Taggart for Express Warranty and/or Negligent Misrepresentation. 
K. The Issuance of Charging Orders Without Notice and a Hearing Was a Denial 
of Substantive and Procedural Due Process; Plaintiffs Appealed the Ruling 
Promptly and Have Not Waived It 
On July 26, 2001, without any prior notice or opportunity to be heard, Judge Bohling 
entertained and granted Defendants' ex parte motion to issue orders charging the limited liability 
company membership interests of JMS Financial, LLC and/or of JMS-Hidden, LLC in and to 
JMS-Meadow, LLC; JMS-Brook, LLC; JMS-Hidden, LLC and Aspenwood, LLC. Based on these 
Orders, CAT purported to have the right to receive distributions from these entities which it 
believed would have otherwise gone to JMS or JMS-Hidden. Contrary to the assertions in 
Defendants' Brief, neither JMS nor JMS-Hidden have ever agreed or otherwise acknowledged that 
the charging orders were properly issued. 
These orders were improper because neither JMS nor JMS-Hidden possessed any 
membership interest in these entities as of July 26, 2001 - they had been previously assigned to 
other creditors of JMS and/or JMS-Hidden in partial satisfaction of pre-existing debt. UCA 48-
2b-131 states the following: 
(1) An interest of a member in a limited liability company is personal property; 
(2) (a) an interest of a member in a limited liability company may be adjusted, transferred, 
or assigned as provided in the operating agreement. 
(b) Except as otherwise provided in the operating agreement, if the nontransferring 
members entitled to receive a majority of the nontransferred profits of the limited liability 
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company, pursuant to Section 48-2b-130, do not consent to the proposed transfer or 
assignment: 
(i) the transferee of the interest of the member has no right to; 
(A) participate in the management of the business and affairs of the limited 
liability company; or 
(B) become a member; and 
(ii) the transferee is entitled to receive only the share of profits or other 
compensation by way of income and the return of contributions to which that 
member would otherwise be entitled. 
(4) (a) On application to a court of competent jurisdiction by any judgment creditor of a 
member in a limited liability company, the court may charge the interest of the member in 
the limited liability company with payment of the unsatisfied amount of the judgment with 
interest. 
(b) To the extend a judgment creditor is a beneficiary of a charging order issued under 
Subsection (4)(a), the judgment creditor has only the rights of a transferee under 
Subsection (2)(b) of the member's interest in the limited liability company. (Emphasis 
Added) 
On July 26, 2001, neither JMS nor JMS-Hidden had any "member's interest" in JMS-
Meadow, LLC, JMS-Brook, LLC, JMS-Hidden, LLC, or Aspenwood, LLC. Neither Defendants 
nor Judge Bohling knew this. But the fact remains that the purported charging orders did not 
"charge" anything. There were no membership interests on that date to be charged. (See Answer 
and Counterclaim filed in CAT. LLC v. JMS Financial LLC et al Civil No. 010906644, in which 
facts relating to these transfers are set forth, attached hereto as Addendum A) 
Further, the charging orders were invalid because substantive and due process rights 
require notice and an opportunity to be heard before what is tantamount to an "execution" or a 
"garnishment" is issued. A charging order is absolutely identical to an execution or garnishment 
upon the interest of the member in the limited liability company. Pursuant to 48-2b-131(2)(b) the 
involuntary transferee of the member's interest only gets the right to "charge" the interest - i.e., 
receive any distributions which might be made, if any, and only when made. The involuntary 
transferee has no management rights whatsoever in the limited liability company, and cannot mess 
around with its internal business affairs. Which is exactly what Judge Bohling allowed CAT to do 
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when he improvidently placed a restraining order on Aspenwood and purported to take jurisdiction 
and control over Aspenwood's internal business affairs. 
Due to earlier Federal and State due process challenges to the way in which writs of 
garnishment and execution were being handled, the State of Utah implemented a procedure 
whereby individuals subjected to these writs are notified of their rights and given an opportunity to 
seek and have a hearing. The same guarantees must be afforded with respect to these so called 
"charging orders." 
If there had been appropriate due process, there would have been a hearing where the issue 
of who owned these interests could have been brought up and these third-parties' rights protected. 
But, rather than have a due process compliant process, the orders were issued ex parte and CAT in 
fact has received at least $125,000.00 in funds from an improper distribution as a result thereof 
which should have gone to third-parties who had liens thereon or otherwise actually owned the 
interests in question at the time the charging orders were entered. 
As the Utah Supreme court has stated, '"Due process' is not a technical concept that can be 
reduced to a formula with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances. Rather, 'the 
demands of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of procedure and demand a procedure 
appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved.'" Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P. 2d 1207 This 
is an opportunity for this Court to establish uniform and constitutionally appropriate procedures for 
the issuance of charging orders. Plaintiffs invite the Court to do so in order to provide the Bar and 
litigants with not only guidance, but constitutional protections as well. 
L. Hal Rosen Fully and Fairly Answered Questions Within the Scope of Inquiry 
Approved by Judge Bohling, but Bohling Sanctioned Him Anyway 
Following the commencement of appellate proceedings, CAT commenced collection and 
execution proceedings. Following entry of Judgment, CAT obtained an Order in Supplemental 
Proceedings dated July 6, 2001. The Order in Supplemental Proceedings purported to require 
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JMS-Hidden, L.L.C("JMS-Hidden"), and JMS-Financial, L.L.C. (UJMS-Financial") through 
Harold Rosen to be examined concerning their assets, liabilities and financial affairs" before a 
court reporter on July 13, 2001 at the offices of CAT's counsel. The Order in Supplemental 
Proceedings further ordered Mr. Rosen to bring with him for copying and inspection "(1) all 
financial statements, profit and loss statements, balance sheets, income statements, general ledgers 
of JMS-Hidden, L.L.C, JMS-Financial, L.L.C, JMS-Meadow, L.L.C. and JMS-Brook, L.L.C; (2) 
all agreements, notes, Trust Deeds, and/or security agreements between JMS-Meadow, L.L.C. and 
Scott R. Turville and/or the Monte Cannon Nelson Trust and David M. Nelson and/or City 
Properties, L.L.C. relating to the Meadowlands project in West Valley City, Utah; and (3) all other 
documents necessary to identify the assets and liabilities of said entities and any liens or 
encumbrances against the assets of said entities, including the amount thereof."(R. 4731-4732) 
CAT served a copy of the Order in Supplemental Proceedings along with a Subpoena 
Duces Tecum to Harold Rosen on the evening of July 6, 2001. The scheduled examination was 
July 13, 2001. Mr. Rosen was going to be in Wyoming on the 13th of July, and the Subpoena 
Duces Tecum failed to give Mr. Rosen 14 days notice as required under Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, on July 12, 2001 Mr. Rosen filed a Motion for Protective Order 
and a Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum. Rosen offered to appear, just not so soon. (R. 
4807-4710) 
Appellants contend that Mr. Rosen was served in a personal capacity. The Order in 
Supplemental Proceedings was never served upon JMS-Hidden or JMS-Financial. In addition to 
the fact that the Order in Supplemental Proceedings was not served on JMS-Financial or JMS-
Hidden, the Order also sought to obtain testimony from the judgment debtors (via Mr. Rosen) 
concerning the assets and liabilities of entities which were not judgment debtors or even parties to 
the action. (R. 4731-4732) 
On July 18,2001, Appellants filed a Motion to Set Aside Order in Supplemental 
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Proceedings and a Consolidated Memorandum in Support of (1) Motion for Protective Order (2) to 
Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum; (3) Set Aside Order in Supplemental Proceedings. (R. 4815-
4851) 
These motions were heard by the Court on July 19, 2001. The Court held that despite the 
fact that the Subpoena Duces Tecum had been served on "Harold Rosen" and had not been served 
upon the registered agent or the managing entity of JMS-Financial or JMS-Hidden, the Court 
found that service on Mr. Rosen personally was the equivalent of service upon JMS-Financial and 
JMS-Hidden, the judgment debtors. The Court also found that service was proper and no order 
shortening the time for Rosen's examination was necessary, despite the fact that no request for 
such an order, let alone good cause for such an order, had been made. Rather than grant him 14 
days from the date of the hearing to prepare for the deposition, the Court ordered Mr. Rosen to 
appear on July 30, 2001. Without entering any evidence into the record in support of such a 
conclusion, the Court stated that even if an order to shorten the time was necessary, "good cause 
existed to shorten the time because of the actions that JMS has undertaken to encumber its assets 
since the Court announced its ruling on June 1, 2001." (R. 4900-4903) 
The Court did modify the Order in Supplemental Proceedings to some extent with respect to 
the documents which Mr. Rosen was required to bring with him. The Order of July 26, 2001 was 
directed to JMS, but required Mr. Rosen to appear to testify on behalf of JMS on July 30, 2001. 
The Order indicated that if Rosen did not have documents pertaining to the non-parties JMS-
Meadow, L.L.C. ("JMS-Meadow") and JMS-Brook, L.L.C. ("JMS-Brook") "in his capacity as 
president of J.D. West, [Inc.], which is a member of JMS-Financial, and JMS itself do not have in 
their possession records concerning the business of JMS-Meadows, L.L.C. and JMS-Brook, 
L.L.C, such documents are not required to be produced at the examination." (R. 4900-4903) 
Rosen subsequently appeared on July 30, 2001 and provided CAT with the documents in his 
possession which related to the business affairs of the judgment debtors, JMS-Hidden and JMS-
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Financial. Mr. Rosen, despite the objections of counsel, insisted that he would appear without 
counsel at the deposition. In addition to providing all of the recent and updated information he had 
concerning the judgment debtors, he also provided some information regarding the affairs of JMS-
Meadow, JMS-Brook and Aspenwood, L.L.C. He complied with the order and the rulings of the 
Court as given on July 19, 2001, and even gave information beyond what he had been required to 
give. (R. 5384, 5126-5195, 5196-5199) 
However, CAT wanted Mr. Rosen to testify as to the internal affairs and private dealings of 
Aspenwood, JMS-Meadow, and JMS-Brook. Despite the badgering of CAT's counsel, Mr. Rosen 
indicated that he was not prepared to testify for those entities who were not judgment debtors or 
parties to the action and the supplemental proceedings thereon. CAT subsequently moved for an 
Order to Show Cause. (R. 5384, 5126-5199) 
At the hearing on the Order to Show Cause, which was held on August 21, 2001, CAT 
misrepresented by proffer of counsel the events of the deposition. A transcript of the deposition 
proceedings was not placed into evidence. Counsel for Appellants pointed out to the Court that 
Mr. Rosen had complied with the previous order of the Court, and even read back to the Court the 
language used in the July 19, 2001 hearing. Additionally, counsel pointed out that there was no 
evidentiary basis to hold Mr. Rosen in contempt or sanction the JMS entities, because there had 
been no evidence entered into the record, other than the proffers of counsel. Counsel also offered 
to read the unsigned deposition transcript into the record at that time if there was any question at 
all in the Court's mind regarding Rosen's compliance. Counsel for Appellants also requested an 
evidentiary hearing on the matter, and requested the Court to recess the proceedings so that a full 
evidentiary hearing could be held. At that time, Mr. Rosen had not even had an opportunity to 
review the transcript. Without so much as looking at the transcript, the Court expressed "outrage" 
at counsel and Mr. Rosen and entered a wholly unsupported finding that Mr. Rosen and the JMS 
entities had failed to comply with the previous orders of the Court. Rosen and the judgment 
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debtors were sanctioned, and Rosen was ordered to appear and "answer the questions that are 
asked" with no reference to the Court's earlier limitations on the scope of inquiry into the private 
business affairs of the non-parties and non-judgment debtors, JMS-Meadow, JMS-Brook, and 
Aspenwood, L.L.C. (R. 5384, 5126-5199). 
The Rules are not clear as to when and how documents may be subpoenaed in connection with 
post-judgment inquiries. Plaintiffs ask the Court of Appeals to declare that if documents are to be 
subpoenaed, the respondent has fourteen days to prepare to produce said documents. Any lesser 
time is insufficient. 
Judge Bohling was originally correct when he limited the inquiry of Rosen to what he knew 
and what he possessed about the judgment debtors, and the Defendants could not ask about the 
limited liability companies in which the Plaintiffs had been members. At the August 21, 2001, 
hearing it was improper for Judge Bq>hling to refuse to hold a proper evidentiary hearing before 
imposing sanctions. Defendants' counsel misrepresented the facts and falsely accused Rosen of 
not complying with Judge Bohling's prior order as to what questions could properly be asked. 
The findings of contempt and the imposition of sanctions were premature, and factually 
insupportable and should be vacated and set aside. Costs and attorneys' fees should be awarded to 
Plaintiffs/Appellants. 
M. The Placing of Aspenwood in a Defacto Receivership Was Procedurally and 
Substantively Improper; the Issue is Certainly Not Moot; Litigation Has 
Arisen to Challenge the Improper Siphoning Off of Monies from Aspenwood 
by CAT and its "Partner" - Dan Mehr 
CAT claims that Judge Bohling had the power to issue the offending preliminary injunction 
because "Rule 69(p) authorizes the Court to require any person or corporation that is indebted to 
the judgment debtor or has property of the judgment debtor in an amount exceeding $250.00 to 
appear before the court to answer concerning the same." Appellee's Brief, p. 92 There are two 
fatal flaws in this analysis. First, under the law of limited liability companies, cited above, the 
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right to receive a membership distribution is not a "debt" which could subject Aspenwood to this 
section. Membership distribution rights are not "debts." If and when a limited liability company 
has excess funds, and determines in its own good business judgment that it wants to make a 
distribution, it may voluntarily do so. And, on the day any such distribution is made, it should go 
to the entities who then own the right to the membership distribution. Neither CAT nor the Court 
had or now has any right to require or otherwise force a membership distribution. If the managers 
of the limited liability company decide to retain profits within the company indefinitely, they are 
free to do so. 
Second, Rule 69(p) only allows questioning as to the supposed "debt" owed to the judgment 
debtor. It does not allow the Court or the judgment creditor to do anything more than inquire 
about the facts concerning the debt. It is like a supplemental order and proceedings. Only 
questions are asked - the judgment debtor is not summarily placed into receivership. 
Involuntary transferees, such as CAT purports to be via its improperly issued charging orders, 
have no right to get involved in the management or internal business affairs of the limited liability 
company. See Herring v. Keasler, 563 S.E. 2d 614 (NC App. 2002)(Enjoining a creditor from 
attempting to sell a judgment debtor's membership interest in a limited liability company)("The 
'charge' does not dissolve the limited liability company or entitle the [judgment creditor] to 
become or exercise any rights of a member") 
But this is exactly what CAT asked Judge Bohling to do. The preliminary injunction 
effectively gave CAT and the Court a say over the management of Aspenwood. A say which is 
not allowed by limited liability company law or Rule 69(p). 
Further, since neither JMS nor JMS-Hidden owned any membership interest in Aspenwood at 
the time of the hearing, Aspenwood did not hold any property of the judgment debtors. The Court 
consequently did not have any jurisdiction over Aspenwood whatsoever. The injunction is void. 
It is true that Dan Mehr purported to take control of Aspenwood, and then made a distribution 
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of Aspenwood funds to himself and CAT. This does not render the issue moot, however, because 
$50,000.00 remained in Aspenwood's accounts; and litigation has been filed against CAT and 
Mehr to recover the $250,000 that they split and distributed to themselves. (See copy of the 
Complaint in Steffensen v. Dan Mehr et al., Civil No. 020905768, attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference as Addendum 1) 
The granting of the preliminary injunction did not satisfy the prerequisites of the Rules. The 
Court did not have jurisdiction over Aspenwood for the purposes of entering the injunction and it 
is therefore void. CAT's purported charging order was improper and void - since there were no 
membership interests to properly be charged. For all of these reasons, the injunction must be 
vacated and the matter remanded for appropriate relief- including the issuance of an order 
directing CAT to return the funds received by it from Aspenwood. 
STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Aspenwood respectfully requests that the Partial Summary Judgment dismissing its claims 
against CAT, Taggart and Coats be set aside and that those matters be remanded for further 
discovery and trial on the merits. 
JMS respectfully requests that Judge Bohling's trial rulings and judgment be vacated, and 
that judgment instead be entered in its favor and against CAT and Taggart. 
Alternatively, JMS requests that Judge Bohling's trial rulings and judgment be vacated, 
and that this matter be remanded, and that on remand, JMS be allowed a full and fair opportunity 
to complete its discovery, and that its claims be tried to a jury. 
JMS and Aspenwood ask that the post-trial rulings made by Judge Bohling be reversed, 
and that CAT be ordered to return the monies received by it from Aspenwood. 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of August, 2002. 
Steffensen • Law • Office 
By " *^^^ / <jt^^^<^^ 
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Addendum 1 - Steffensen v. Mehr et al. Complaint 
Brian W. Steffensen, P.C. (3092) 
Damian E. Davenport (8169) 
William J. Middleton (7580) 
Steffensen ••• Law ••• Office 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone (801) 485-3707 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Brian W. Steffensen a COMPLAINT 
a Professional Law Corporation; 
Brian W. Steffensen, Jury Demand 
Plaintiffs, 
Dan Mehr; C.A. T., LLC; 
Paul Taggart; John Coats; Lonnie Oman; 
Kent Hoggan; Anthony J. Famulary; 
Burbidge and Mitchell; Mckay, Burton & Thurman; 
Karl Prisbrey, John Does 1-100; Civil No.: Ol &\ P^Ltf 
Judge: £wfrSA#i 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs Brian W. Steffensen a Professional Law Corporation, dba Brian W. Steffensen, 
P.C, also doing business under the name "Steffensen Law Office," and Brian W. Steffensen, 
individually ("Steffensen"), without prejudice to their right to file an amended complaint after 
discovery, hereby complain and allege as follows. 
PARTIES 




'"!2~ Fitn. ^ 
("Steffensen Law") is a Utah Professional Corporation, which at all times relevant hereto 
engaged in the business of providing professional legal services and also did business 
under the name "Steffensen Law Offices." Brian W. Steffensen ("Steffensen") is an 
individual who lent monies through JD West Associates, Inc. ("JD West"), through JMS 
Financial, LLC ("JMS Financial") to Aspenwood,-LLC ("Aspenwood"), JMS-Meadow, 
LLC ("Meadow") and JMS-Brook, LLC. ("Brook") 
2. Dan Mehr ("Mehr") is an individual residing in Utah County, but doing business in Salt 
Lake County. 
3. C.A.T. L.L.C. ("CAT") is a Utah limited liability company controlled by Paul Taggart 
and John Coats. 
4. Paul Taggart ("Taggart") is an individual residing in the State of Utah and is subject to 
the jurisdiction of this Court. 
5. John Coats ("Coats") is an individual residing in the State of Utah and is subject to the 
jurisdiction of this Court. 
6. Lonnie Oman ("Oman") is an individual residing in the State of Utah and is subject to the 
jurisdiction of this Court. 
7. Kent Hoggan ("Hoggan") is an individual residing in the State of Utah and is subject to 
the jurisdiction of this Court. 
8. Anthony Famulary ("Famulary") is an attorney licensed to practice law within the state of 
Utah and is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. 
9. Burbidge & Mitchell ("Burbidge") is a Utah law firm doing business in Salt Lake County, 
Utah, and acted as counsel for CAT in the CAT litigation. 
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10. McKay, Burton & Thurman ("McKay") is a Utah law firm doing business in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
11. Karl Prisbrey is an individual living in the State of Utah. 
12. Does 1-100 are individuals whose names are not presently known to Plaintiffs but are 
individuals and/or entities which have improperly received payments from Aspenwood, 
or the proceeds of payments made to one or more of the other defendants herein, with 
actual or constructive notice of Steffensen Law's attorneys' lien described below, and/or 
who have participated in inducing Aspenwood and Mehr to violate their fiduciary and/or 
contractual duties to Steffensen Law, and whose names will be added and substituted as 
their identities become known through discovery in this matter. 
JURISDICTION 
13. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 78 of the Utah Code Annotated, this Court has subject 
matter jurisdiction over the claims set forth in this complaint, and venue over these claims 
is proper in this Court. 
FACTS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 
14. During the first week of January, 1998, Aspenwood retained Steffensen Law to act as 
counsel in various legal matters, beginning with a lawsuit filed by Russell Packard 
against Aspenwood, Civil No. 98-0406523, Fourth District Court, Utah County, State of 
Utah, hereinafter referred to as the "Russell Packard Litigation." 
15. Steffensen Law was also hired to resolve a dispute between Aspenwood and Lonnie 
Oman, Kent Hoggan and Newport Holdings concerning the real estate project known as 
"Hidden Ridge" in Springville, Utah. Aspenwood sued Oman and Hoggan, Civil No. 
-3-
990402395, Fourth District Court, Utah County, State of Utah, hereinafter referred to as 
the "Oman-Hoggan Litigation." 
16. Steffensen Law was hired to litigate a claim against C.A.T., L.L.C., John Coats, and Paul 
Taggart, Civil No. 99091191, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
hereinafter referred to as the "CAT Litigation." 
17. Steffensen Law was also hired to represent Aspenwood in various minor negotiations and 
other matters concerning creditor disputes and to provide advice regarding development 
issues, and various other matters which did not result in litigation but did require legal 
advice and professional services from Steffensen Law. 
18. Aspenwood agreed to pay Steffensen Law for these services on an hourly basis at the 
office's regular hourly rates, as adjusted from time to time; which ranged from $165.00 
per hour in 1998 to $195.00 per hour, and to reimburse Steffensen Law for all costs 
advanced. The agreement provided that interest at 18% per annum would be due and 
payable on past due amounts, and that Steffensen Law would be entitled to recover its 
costs of collection, plus attorney's fees. 
19. In order to achieve the results sought by Aspenwood, as noted above, Steffensen Law 
was required to expend significant amounts of time and resources in litigating the Russell 
Packard, Oman-Hoggan and CAT matters. 
20. The litigation efforts, noted above, have been ongoing for approximately three years. 
Periodically during this period of time, Steffensen Law has sent billing statements and 
statements of account to Aspenwood and its co-plaintiffs. During this period of time and 
up through approximately the end of July, 2001, neither Aspenwood nor its co-plaintiffs 
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complained about the services rendered or efforts made by Steffensen Law on behalf of 
them, or ever directed Steffensen Law to cease any work on their behalf. 
A substantial amount of fees were due and owing to Steffensen Law as of June 12, 2001, 
and had been past due for over thirty days with no agreement as to payment. On that date, 
Steffensen Law filed Notices of Attorney's Lien in the CAT lawsuit, and faxed copies of 
the same to Burbidge, counsel for CAT in the CAT lawsuit. Amended Notices of 
Attorney's Lien were filed June 13, 2001 in the CAT lawsuit, and served on Burbidge. 
Then Notices of Attorney's Lien were recorded against the real property of JMS-
Meadow, LLC and JMS-Brook, LLC; and copies of all of the same were served on JMS 
Financial, JMS-Hidden, Aspenwood, LLC, JMS-Meadow, LLC, and JMS-Brook, LLC 
within 30 days of filing. The filing and then recordation of these liens put Aspenwood, 
Mehr, CAT, Taggart, Coats, Famulary, Burbidge, McKay, Prisbrey, Oman, Hoggan and 
any and all other persons or entities of any nature on either actual or constructive notice 
of Steffensen Law's attorneys' lien. 
On June 12,2001, JD West granted to Steffensen and other lenders ("JD West Lenders") 
a lien on its membership interest in, and rights to receive monies for any reason from, 
JMS Financial. Watson Family LC similarly granted to its lenders ("Watson Lenders") a 
lien on its membership interest in, and rights to receive monies for any reason from, JMS 
Financial. JMS Financial then granted to the JD West Lenders and the Watson Lenders 
(collectively the JMS Lenders) a lien on its membership interests in, and its rights to 
receive payment of monies for any reason from, JMS-Hidden, JMS-Meadow and JMS-
Brook. JMS-Hidden granted a lien to the JMS Lenders on its membership interest in, and 
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its rights to receive payment of monies for any reason from, Aspenwood, LLC. These 
UCC1 filings on June 12, 2001 put all Defendants herein on actual and/or constructive 
notice of the interest of the JMS Lenders. 
23. Later on June 12,2001, JD West assigned to the JD West Lenders all of its rights to 
receive monies from JMS Financial. Watson Family LC assigned to the Watson Lenders 
all of its rights to receive monies from JMS Financial. JMS Financial and JMS-Hidden 
assigned all of their rights to receive monies from Aspenwood, JMS-Meadow and JMS-
Brook to the JMS Lenders. 
24. On June 15, 2001, JMS Financial and JMS-Hidden assigned their membership interests in 
JMS-Hidden, Aspenwood, JMS-Meadow, JMS-Brook to JD West and Watson Family 
LC, 50/50. 
25. On or about June 28,2001, the Court in the CAT lawsuit granted judgment in favor of 
CAT and against JMS Financial and JMS-Hidden for approximately $700,000.00. 
26. In early July, 2001, Aspenwood promised Steffensen Law that it would pay to Steffensen 
Law, by the end of July, its entire attorneys fee bill less certain discounts agreed to by 
Steffensen Law. This constituted an accord and satisfaction with respect to the amount of 
fees owed to Steffensen Law, and the amount agreed upon became fully liquidated. 
27. On or about July 26, 2001, CAT obtained, without any prior notice and opportunity to be 
heard, ex-parte "Charging Orders" purporting to grant CAT the right to receive all 
distributions from Aspenwood, JMS-Meadow and JMS-Brook - despite the fact that said 
interests had been transferred a month and a half before to the JMS Lenders. 
Constitutional procedural due process was denied in the granting of said ex parte charging 
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orders. Substantively, they were improper due to the prior assignment/transfer to the JMS 
Lenders, including Brian Steffensen. 
In late July, 2001, Mehr and entities related to him purported to take control of 
Aspenwood, JMS-Meadow and JMS-Brook. Then, despite being fully aware of the rights 
and interests of the Plaintiffs pursuant to Steffensen Law's attorney's lien on 
Aspenwood's proceeds from the Oman-Hoggan lawsuit, and the JMS Lenders, including 
Steffensen Law's rights, as assignee, in and to any distributions and/or payments from 
Aspenwood, caused Aspenwood to make a $250,000 "membership distribution" -
$125,000 to CAT and $125,000 to Baucorp and/or its assigns. Not only were funds not 
retained to pay Steffensen Law's legal fees and the JMS Lenders, insufficient funds were 
retained to pay the other debts of Aspenwood. It was against state law and/or the 
provisions of the articles and operating agreement of Aspenwood to make said 
"membership distribution" without retaining sufficient funds to pay the debts of 
Aspenwood. 
Upon information and belief, CAT, Taggart, Coats, Burbidge & Mitchell, Oman and/or 
Hoggan vigorously worked to convince Aspenwood and Mehr to breach Aspenwood's 
contract to pay Steffensen Law the agreed upon liquidated amount of legal fees, by 
distributing funds which were ear marked and due to Steffensen Law and subject to its 
lien. CAT, Taggart, Coats, Burbidge & Mitchell, Oman and Hoggan also intentionally 
and knowingly induced Aspenwood and Mehr to ignore and violate the rights of Brian 
Steffensen and the other JMS Lenders, and other Aspenwood creditors, to receive 
payments, including distributions, pursuant to the June 12, 2001, assignments/transfers. 
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30. Upon information and belief, CAT, Burbidge, Taggart and Coats (and Does 1-50) 
received a portion of the improper "equity distribution," and/or the proceeds of the same, 
and took the same with actual or constructive knowledge of the prior interests of 
Steffensen Law and Brian Steffensen and the other JMS Lenders. Consequently, they 
should be ordered to pay over to Steffensen Law and/or Brian Steffensen and the other 
JMS Lenders, as determined by the Court at trial, all of such monies received by them. 
31. Plaintiffs are entitled to an equitable lien on all assets of the defendants which have been 
purchased by, paid in part for, or otherwise become a depository for and/or beneficiary of 
the proceeds of the improper equity distribution, and to foreclose on the same. 
32. Famulary, Prisbrey and McKay also received monies subject to the prior interest of 
Steffensen Law in and to said funds pursuant to Steffensen Law's attorney's lien, and 
should be ordered to pay over to Steffensen Law all such monies. 
33. Mehr and Aspenwood owed a fiduciary duty to the creditors of Aspenwood, and violated 
that duty in causing funds to be "distributed" to CAT and to Baucorp or its assigns when 
they knew that said monies were due and owing to Steffensen Law ,Bnan Steffensen and 
the other JMS Lenders. 
34. It was a violation of the representations, warranties, promises and agreements made by 
Mehr prior to JMS Financial's investment in Aspenwood, Meadow and Brook, that 
Steffensen, Hal Rosen, Pam Watson and Brent Watson, through their designees, JD West, 
Watson Family LC and/or JMS Financial, would have operational control over those 
projects. The purported take over of control of Aspenwood, Meadow and Brook violated 
said representations, warranties, promises and agreements. 
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35. Upon information and belief, CAT, Taggart, Coats, Burbidge & Mitchell, Oman and/or 
Hoggan vigorously worked to convince Aspenwood and Mehr to breach said 
representations, warranties, promises and/or agreements; and did in fact induce Mehr to 
breach said representations, warranties, promises and/or agreements. 
36. Steffensen Law's hourly rates during the course of the representation of Aspenwood and 
its co-plaintiffs, as per the parties' agreements, are consistent with the rates ordinarily 
charged in this market area and in line with the experience and expertise of Steffensen 
Law and the attorneys employed therein. 
37. The charges and costs noted above were all incurred in connection with the agreements 
between Steffensen Law and Aspenwood and its co-plaintiffs are fair, reasonable, and 
just under the circumstances of those engagements. The discounted amount agreed upon 
to be paid to Steffensen Law was fair and reasonable. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
LIEN FORECLOSURE 
(All Defendants) 
38. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference all of the allegations contained in 
this complaint. 
39. Steffensen Law provided attorney services to Aspenwood in various matters as described 
above that benefitted Aspenwood. At no time during the performance of these services 
did Aspenwood or its co-plaintiffs complain about the services rendered or ask that 
Steffensen Law cease providing services. 
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40. Steffensen Law has not been paid in full for these services, leaving a balance due in the 
approximate amount of $300,000.00, the exact amount which will be determined at trial, 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of each billing 
on the account until paid in full, plus lien filing and foreclosure costs, costs of suit and 
attorney's fees. 
41. Within thirty (30) days after the filing of said Notice of Lien, copies thereof were mailed 
to CAT, Burbidge, and Aspenwood. The filing and then recordation of these liens put all 
Defendants and any and all other persons or entities of any nature on either actual or 
constructive notice of the Steffensen Law attorneys lien. 
42. Steffensen Law filed an attorney's lien pursuant to the Utah Code Annotated § 38-2-7 (as 
amended) against the real and personal property of Aspenwood, JMS-Meadow and JMS-
Brook. Steffensen Law is entitled to collect its costs and reasonable attorney's fees under 
these attorney's liens incurred in foreclosing upon the lien. 
43. The liens of Steffensen Law on the property described therein are superior to the rights, 
titles, claims and interests of Defendants herein. Upon information and belief, 
Aspenwood has caused monies to be paid to individuals and/or entities who received said 
monies with actual or constructive knowledge of the claims asserted by Steffensen Law 
and of Steffensen Law's attorneys' lien. 
44. Steffensen Law is entitled to an order from the Court ascertaining the priority of the 
parties' claims to the property against which Steffensen Law's attorneys' lien claims are 
lodged and against any proceeds of same which may have been derived therefrom - via 
the imposition of the equitable lien referred to above, and further, for an order directing 
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that any remaining property subject to the attorney's lien, which constitutes the proceeds 
of the improper equity distribution and/or the property received in contravention to the 
attorney's lien, and/or against which an equitable lien sought hereunder is found to 
properly lie, be sold at sheriffs sale with the proceeds thereof, after satisfaction of all 
costs of sale, be applied to the amount owed to Steffensen Law with respect to the 
property as prayed for herein; with the balance of the proceeds, if any, to be paid to junior 
claimants; and granting Steffensen Law a deficiency judgment for any amounts awarded 
Steffensen Law herein not satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale of the property, and 
improvements thereon, including interest, all allowable costs and attorney's fees. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT/ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
(Defendants CAT, Taggart, Burbidge & Mitchell, Coats, Mehr, Oman and Hoggan ) 
45. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference all of the allegations contained in 
the complaint. 
46. Through the acts complained of herein, Defendants CAT, Taggart, Coats, Burbidge & 
Mitchell, Oman and Hoggan intentionally interfered with Plaintiffs' economic relations 
with Aspenwood and the plaintiffs by inducing Mehr to purport to take control of 
Aspenwood, Meadow and Brook, and by inducing Aspenwood and Mehr to breach 
Aspenwood's contract to pay Steffensen Law for legal fees, by distributing funds which 
were ear marked and due to Steffensen Law, and subject to Steffensen Law's attorney's 
lien and by inducing Aspenwood and Mehr to ignore and violate the rights of Brian W. 
Steffensen and the other JMS Lenders and creditors to receive payments, including 
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distributions, pursuant to the June 12, 2001, assignments/transfers. 
47. Through the acts complained of herein, Mehr intentionally interfered with Plaintiffs' 
economic relations by taking control of Aspenwood, JMS-Meadow and JMS-Brook, and, 
despite being fully aware of the rights and interests of Steffensen Law, pursuant to its 
attorney's lien and the JMS Lenders', including Brian W. Steffensen's, priority rights as 
assignees under the June 12,2001, assignment/transfer in and to any distributions and/or 
payments from Aspenwood, caused Aspenwood to make a $125,000 "membership 
distribution" to CAT and a $125,00 "membership distribution" to Baucorp and/or its 
assigns, and to pay monies to Defendants Famulary, McKay, Burton &Thurman and 
Prisbrey, which monies were subject to Steffensen Law's attorney's lien. 
48. Defendants' intentional interference complained of herein, was performed for an 
improper purpose and/or by improper means. 
49. Defendants' intentional interference complained of herein has caused and continues to 
cause Plaintiffs' economic damage in amounts to be determined at trial, but which is not 
less than $300,000.00 for Steffensen Law. 
50. Defendants' actions were wilful, wanton, malicious and/or with reckless disregard for the 
rights of Plaintiffs, and therefore entitle Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount to be 
determined at trial, but not less than $1,000,000. 
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
CIVIL CONSPIRACY 
(Defendants CAT, Taggart, Coats, Burbidge & Mitchell, Oman, 
Hoggan, Aspenwood and Mehr) 
51. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference all of the allegations contained in 
the complaint. 
52. Defendants CAT, Taggart, Coats, Burbidge & Mitchell, Oman, Hoggan, Aspenwood and 
Mehr have knowingly encouraged, participated in and benefitted from the foregoing 
breaches and wrongful conduct of all Defendants. A civil conspiracy exists under the 
facts of this Complaint because there are two or more persons acting in collusion to 
accomplish an unlawful purpose and/or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful or 
illegal means. Defendants have engaged in a civil conspiracy to improperly distribute 
money to themselves and away from Plaintiffs, in direct violation and contravention of 
Plaintiffs' first priority right to receive payments, including distributions, under 
Steffensen Law's attorney's lien and Brian W. Steffensen's and other JMS Lenders rights 
under the June 12, 2001, assignments/transfers; all in violation of state law, the articles 
and operating agreement of Aspenwood; and by engaging in the torts alleged herein 
53. The civil conspiracy entered into by Defendants have damaged Plaintiffs in an amount to 
be determined at the time of trial. 
54. Defendants' actions were wilful, wanton, malicious and/or with reckless disregard for the 
rights of Plaintiffs, and therefore entitle Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount to be 
determined at trial. 
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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF LOYALTY AND TRUST 
(Defendant Mehr) 
55. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference all of the allegations contained in 
the complaint. 
56. In conjunction with Mehr taking control of Aspenwood, Mehr assumed and owed 
fiduciajy duties, including but not limited to duties of loyalty and trust, to Aspenwood, its 
various members per the assignment and creditors to refrain from self-dealing and 
wrongful distributions in light of the monies owed by Aspenwood to Steffensen Law, 
Brian W. Steffensen and other JMS Lenders and creditors. 
57. In addition, Aspenwood had and owed fiduciary duties, including but not limited to duties 
of loyalty and trust, to its various members per the assignment and creditors to refrain 
from making wrongful distributions in light of the monies owed to Steffensen Law, Brian 
W. Steffensen and other JMS Lenders and creditors. 
58. Mehr breached his fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs, including but not limited to the duty of 
loyalty and trust, through the acts set forth above. 
59. Mehr breached his fiduciary duty by causing Aspenwood to breach its fiduciary duties to 
plaintiffs, including but not limited to the duty of loyalty and trust, through the acts set 
forth above. 
60. The breaches of fiduciary responsibilities and duties by Mehr were willful and 
intentional. 
61. The breaches of fiduciary responsibilities and duties by Mehr and Aspenwood have 
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seriously caused harm to Plaintiffs. 
62. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct by Mehr and through him, of Aspenwood, 
Plaintiffs, and each of them, have suffered injuries and damages as alleged herein and as 
will be proven at trial, but which is not less than $300,000.00 for Steffensen Law, for 
which Mehr is liable. 
63. Mehr's actions were wilful, wanton, malicious and/or with reckless disregard for the 
rights of Plaintiffs, and therefore entitle Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount to be 
determined at trial. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
CONVERSION 
64. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference all of the allegations contained in 
the complaint. 
65. Without the consent of Plaintiffs and despite Defendants express and constructive 
knowledge of Steffensen Law's attorney lien and the JMS Lenders, including Brian W. 
Steffensen's rights as assignees, Defendants have wrongfully deprived Plaintiffs'of their 
possessory rights to their property - specifically, money owed in connection with the 
legal fees incurred as a direct result of the Steffensen Law's resources in litigating the 
Russell Packard, Oman-Hoggan and CAT matters and the JMS Lenders rights to receive 
distributions of higher priority under the June 12,2001, assignments/transfers, for which 
they seek compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
66. Defendants have converted the monies received directly or indirectly by them, from the 
equity distribution, which sums they knew or should have known, should have gone to 
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Plaintiffs pursuant to Steffensen Law's attorney's lien and the JMS Lenders, including 
Brian W. Steffensen, priority rights under the June 12, 2001, assignment/transfer. 
67. Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against Defendants equal to the monies they wrongfully 
received/converted. 
68. Defendants' actions were wilful, wanton, malicious and/or with reckless disregard for the 
rights of Plaintiffs, and therefore entitle Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount to be 
determined at trial. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
(Defendants CAT, Taggart, Coats, Burbidge & Mitchell, Oman, Hoggan, and Mehr) 
69. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference all of the allegations contained in 
the complaint. 
70. Defendants' conduct, as described more fully above, is malicious and manifests a 
knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, Plaintiffs' rights. 
Accordingly, an award of punitive damages against Defendants CAT, Taggart, Coats, 
Burbidge & Mitchell, Oman, Hoggan and Mehr, and each of them, is warranted so as to 
punish Defendants and deter such conduct in the future. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against the Defendants as follows: 
1. For an order from the Court ascertaining the priority of the parties' claims to the property 
against which Plaintiff Steffensen Law's attorneys lien and equitable lien claims attach 
and/or attached, and any proceeds of same which may have been derived therefrom, and 
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further, an order directing that any property subject to said liens be sold at Sheriffs sale 
with the proceeds thereof, after satisfaction of all costs of sale, applied to the amount 
owed to Plaintiff Steffensen Law with respect to the property as prayed for herein; with 
the balance of the proceeds, if any, to be paid to junior claimants; and granting Plaintiff 
Steffensen Law a deficiency judgment for any amounts awarded Plaintiff Steffensen Law 
herein not satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale of the property, and improvements 
thereon, including interest, all allowable costs and attorneys fees; 
2. For a determination of the amount of unpaid and owing attorneys fees, and a declaration 
that said amount, plus interest at 18% per annum on this amount from the date of each 
billing on the account is due and owing for all purposes in this complaint; 
3. For damages arising from the Defendants CAT, Taggart, Coats, Burbidge & Mitchell, 
Mehr, Oman and Hoggan's Intentional Interference with Contract/Economic Relations in 
such amount as is determined at trial, but not less than $300,000.00 for Plaintiff 
Steffensen Law, for a further award of compensatory damages arising from said actions in 
an amount to be determined at trial, and for an award of punitive damages as a result of 
said conduct, in an amount to be determined at trial, but not less than $1,000,000.00; 
4. For an award of compensatory damages arising from the Defendants CAT, Taggart, 
Coats, Burbidge & Mitchell, Mehr, Oman and Hoggan's Civil Conspiracy in an amount 
to be determined at trial, and for an award of punitive damages, in an amount to be 
determined at trial, as a result of said conduct; 
5. For damages arising from the Defendant Mehr's Breach of fiduciary duties of loyalty and 
trust in such amount as is determined at trial, but not less than $300,000.00 for Plaintiff 
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Steffensen Law, for a further award of compensatory damages arising from said actions in 
an amount to be determined at trial, and for an award of punitive damages as a result of 
said conduct, in an amount to be determined at trial; 
6. For an award of damages against all Defendants equal to the monies said Defendants 
wrongfully received/converted, and for an award of punitive damages as a result of said 
conduct, in an amount to be determined at trial; 
7. For an award of punitive damages against each Defendant to punish them for their 
malicious and reckless conduct and to deter such conduct in the future; 
8. For an award of all costs, attorneys fees and other charges to be incurred in connection 
with this action to collect for breach of contract and lien foreclosure, and for an award for 
all costs, attorneys fees and other charges incurred in prosecution of each of the other 
claims asserted herein; 
9. For a trial by jury on all issues so triable; 
10. And for such other, further relief as this Court may deem just, equitable, and appropriate 
under the circumstances of this proceeding. 
TRIAL BY JURY IS DEMANDED. 
Dated this *2 C> day of June, 2002. 




2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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